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I. INTRODUCTION
Jamie and Angel had been sharing a New York City apartment for six
months when Angel hit Jamie for the first time.1  Jamie forgave him but quietly
suspected that life with Angel would be far from ideal.  Angel was volatile and
unpredictable—Jamie could never figure out how to avoid setting off his temper.
Within three months of the first assault, Angel had left dark, visible bruises on
Jamie’s body four more times.  Even in warm weather, Jamie now resorted to
wearing long sleeve shirts and pants to keep the marks hidden.  But after each
violent episode, Angel was penitent, explaining that his outbursts were due to
stress at work and promising that everything would be better after his schedule
lightened.  Jamie weighed Angel’s apologies and commitment against the fleeting
moments of fear and decided to keep the relationship together.
One night, Angel’s fists put Jamie in the hospital with a broken nose and a
concussion.  Angel spoke to the admitting nurse on Jamie’s behalf, claiming that
Jamie’s injuries were the result of slipping on icy pavement.  Jamie dared not
correct Angel.  Each time the medical staff exited the room, Angel threatened to
make Jamie’s life a living hell if anyone, including the police, found out the truth.
Now, instead of Angel promising to be better, Jamie was promising not to tell
when things got worse.
And things did get worse.  Once out of the hospital, Jamie lived like a pris-
oner, behaving in whatever ways were likely to avoid another beating, but this
only seemed to feed Angel’s paranoia.  When Jamie came home from a follow-up
visit with the doctor, Angel exploded.  The trip was not pre-approved, and Jamie
could not seem to account for the time to Angel’s satisfaction.  Amid a barrage of
death threats and obscenities, Angel held Jamie in a headlock until Jamie passed
out.  Jamie awoke after Angel stormed out and discovered that Angel had contin-
ued the attack well after unconsciousness set in, layering kicks upon punches and
then leaving Jamie’s broken body on the bathroom floor.  Jamie fled to a motel
that night and called a domestic violence hotline for help in getting a restraining
order against Angel.
The hotline counselor who answered Jamie’s call was prepared to offer two
options:  call the police and have the abusive person arrested or petition the fam-
ily court for intervention.  But upon hearing the voice on the line asking for help,
the counselor knew that family court was not an option for Jamie.
Jamie, as it turns out, is a man and if he wanted legal protection against
Angel, Angel would have to be arrested first.  Jamie’s story exemplifies the di-
lemma faced by thousands of domestic violence victims in New York.  Twenty-
five to thirty-three percent of all intimate relationships involve some form of
threats or physical violence.2  New York has responded to this epidemic by offer-
1. The following is a fictional account of a relationship suffering from escalating abuse by one partner
against the other.
2. See An Abuse, Rape, Domestic Violence Aid and Resource Collection, http://www.aardvarc.org/dv/gay.
shtml (last visited Nov. 25, 2006); see also MAURA O’KEEFE, TEEN DATING VIOLENCE: A REVIEW OF
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ing victims a form of injunctive relief against abusive parties known as an “Or-
der of Protection” (“OP”).3 An OP can be obtained through both criminal and
civil proceedings, but New York’s Family Court Act (“FCA”) limits availability
of civil OPs to members of the abuser’s “family or household,” which includes only
relations by blood, marriage (or former marriage), or children shared in com-
mon.4  Notably absent from this definition are heterosexual intimate partners
who are unmarried and do not have a child in common (“dating partners/
couples”), regardless of the length and commitment of their relationship.  Addi-
tionally, most same-sex couples cannot utilize the FCA, because New York does
not recognize same-sex marriages,5 and because the Act does not pertain to
couples who have entered into valid civil unions or domestic partnerships.6
While victims of “family or household” members control when and to what extent
they pursue a family court OP, all those excluded from this definition must rely
on law enforcement officials to arrest and prosecute the abuser before they can
seek an OP.
This note argues that the patterns and prevalence of abuse in dating and
same-sex relationships justify expanding access to civil OPs to include all victims,
regardless of marital status or shared children.7  Part II of this note will discuss
the similarities of victims’ experiences across every type of intimate relationship
and the advantages of making family court OP proceedings available to victims.
Part III will examine how recent, narrow judicial interpretations of the Family
Court Act and the Domestic Relations Law (“DRL”) likely exclude dating and
RISK FACTORS AND PREVENTION EFFORTS 1 (Apr. 2005), http://new.vawnet.org/Assoc_Files_VAWnet/
AR_TeenDatingViolence.pdf (demonstrating similar trends of violence in teen relationships).
3. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 828, 842 (McKinney 2007); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 530.12, 530.13
(McKinney 2007).
4. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1)(a)–(d) (McKinney 2007).
5. See Hernandez v. Robles, 7 N.Y.3d 338, 357, 361 (2006).
6. The sole exception is the same-sex couple that has adopted a child together.  The New York Domestic
Relations Law allows a person to adopt another person if the adopting party is unmarried or is the spouse
of the adopted child’s birthparent. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 110 (McKinney 2007).  In same-sex partner-
ships, wherein one partner wishes to adopt the other’s biological child (creating a child in common), he or
she can do so by qualifying as an unmarried adopting party.  The adoption process would create a legally
cognizable parent-child relationship between the adopting person and his partner’s child. N.Y. DOM.
REL. LAW § 117(1)(c) (McKinney 2007).  However, when the adopting parent is not married to the
adopted child’s birth parent, Section 117(1)(a) operates to sever the birth parent’s ties to the child, thereby
defeating same-sex partners’ intentions to create a legal, two-parent family. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§ 117(1)(a) (McKinney 2007).  The Court of Appeals resolved this problem in Matter of Jacob, 86
N.Y.2d 651 (1995), in which it refused to construe Section 117 as dissolving the parent-child relationships
of unmarried birth parents whose partners adopted their children, citing a public policy of reading adop-
tion statutes to serve children’s welfare by providing them with two parents. See id. at 656, 658,
662–64.
7. Although this note will discuss the limitations of the Family Court Act in terms of its effect on dating and
same-sex couples, other familial bonds such as step-relationships are also adversely affected and may bene-
fit from the proposed solutions.
281
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\52-2\NLR202.txt unknown Seq: 6  7-FEB-08 9:35
ROCKS, HARD PLACES, AND UNCONVENTIONAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS
same-sex victims from obtaining standing to seek a civil OP.  This section will
also examine the problems attendant in limiting this large segment of domestic
violence victims to relying solely upon the criminal justice system.  Part IV will
propose to remedy these limitations within the FCA by (1) expanding the FCA
definition of “family or household” members to include intimate partners and
other familial relationships, (2) deriving a functional checklist of factors evincing
a likely partnership between two people living in a single household, and (3)
developing a new statewide household registry—enrollment in which creates a
presumption of familial commitment and preserves the right to family court in-
tervention before any problems in the relationship arise.
II. THE FAMILY COURT ADVANTAGE
A. Dating and Same-Sex Couples: Prevalence, Patterns, and Costs
of Domestic Violence
Domestic violence is the “systematic exercise of illegitimate power and coer-
cive control by one partner over another” through physical, psychological, emo-
tional, and financial means.8  This definition very clearly applies to any intimate
or familial relationship regardless of formal, legally-recognized ties.  Same-sex
and heterosexual dating couples experience abuse at nearly identical rates as mar-
ried couples and heterosexual couples with a child in common.9  Moreover, the
responses to abuse are similar among victims across married, dating, and same-
sex relationships.  Victims in every type of intimate relationship manifest pat-
terns of hiding, minimizing, or otherwise masking the abuse.10  Victims also
share well-founded fears of increased violence if they try to leave their relation-
ships,11 of being unable to support themselves due to financial dependence on the
abuser,12 and of social isolation from friends and family cultivated by the abuser
over time.13  For these reasons, victims in heterosexual and same-sex relation-
8. See Sandra E. Lundy, Abuse That Dare Not Speak Its Name: Assisting Victims of Lesbian and Gay
Domestic Violence in Massachusetts, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 273, 275–76 (1993).
9. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
10. See Lundy, supra note 8, at 281–85.
11. See Jill Laurie Goodman, Thinking About Danger and Safety, in LAWYER’S MANUAL ON DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE:  REPRESENTING THE VICTIM 28 (Jill Laurie Goodman & Dorchen A. Leidholt eds., 4th ed.
2005) (“As domestic violence victim advocates well know, violence often escalates when a woman sepa-
rates from her abuser.”); Rita Thaemert, Till Violence Do Us Part, 19 ST. LEGISLATURES 26 (1993),
available at http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Til1+violence+do+us+part-a013834300 (“Women leaving a
batterer are at a 75 percent higher risk of being killed by them than those who stay.”).
12. See Lundy, supra note 8, at 280–81 (noting that battered victims who leave their abuser must often
return due to economic pressures, and that reactions to abuse are similar in both heterosexual and homo-
sexual relationships).
13. See id. at 279, 285–86.
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ships are equally as likely to stay with an abusive partner as are married
victims.14
From an economic perspective, unaddressed domestic violence increases the
amount of resources exhausted in responding to a victim’s emotional and physical
injuries.  In one year alone, emergency room resources and staff serve victims at a
cost of nearly $4.1 billion annually.15  Employers lose workplace productivity
when victims are forced to take time off to hide injuries or to comply with an
abuser’s demands.16  Victims also lose the wages and benefits that could assist
them in becoming independent,17 all while becoming more and more isolated
from the social network comprised of family, friends, and coworkers who could
help support them.18
It is also widely recognized that vesting domestic violence victims with con-
trol over the matters affecting them is of paramount importance in keeping them
safe.19  A victim’s intimate proximity to their abuser makes them an expert in the
abuser’s patterns of violence, and the decision to stay with an abuser quite often
results from a victim’s assessment that the abuser will become more violent if he
or she tries to leave.20  Victims are therefore more likely to forego seeking legal
intervention that will limit their level of direct control over the outcome and
expose the abuser to stigmatizing processes like arrest and prosecution.21
14. It is sometimes argued that heterosexual victims with children are more likely to stay with their abusers
than victims in other intimate relationships without children.  This argument fails to consider that vic-
tims in same-sex relationships are frequently subject to greater emotional dependence on abusers, because
their sexuality increases their social isolation from the community and its resources. See id. at 285.
Among heterosexual dating couples, the absence of marriage or children can be supplanted by other “sub-
stantial commitment[s] to the relationship [such as] moving in together, relocating [or] making a major
financial investment to benefit the [abuser].” Id. at 279.
15. NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (Mar. 2003),
available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncipc/pub-res/ipv_cost/IPVBook-Final-Feb18.pdf (estimating the costs
associated with intimate partner violence towards women).
16. Id. 
17. Id.
18. See Lundy, supra note 8, at 284–88.
19. See OFFICE FOR THE PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, MODEL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE POLICY
FOR COUNTIES (1998), available at http://www.opdv.state.ny.us/coordination/model_policy/guiding.
html (“One of the goals of intervention is to restore the victim’s control over her own life. It is important,
therefore, not to make decisions for her or to make personal judgments about her actions.”).
20. See, e.g., Lundy, supra note 8 at 280–81.
21. See generally BARBARA J. HART, BATTERED WOMEN AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, MINN.
CTR. AGAINST VIOLENCE & ABUSE, available at http://www.mincava.umn.edu/documents/hart/hart.
html#id2295958 (last visited Oct. 7, 2007).
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B. The Family Court Order of Protection Process and Victim
Discretion
Access to family court OPs provides victims with nearly complete discretion
in determining when and how to pursue OPs to adequately serve their interests.
With the enactment of the Family Court Act in 1962,22 New York recognized
domestic violence as a unique type of offense, and sought to provide victims with
a civil action aimed at ending violence and family disruption through protective
measures.23  Under Article Eight of the Family Court Act, titled “Family Offense
Proceedings,” the family court and criminal court share concurrent jurisdiction
over “Family Offenses”:  a small set of crimes and violations enumerated in the
New York Penal Law and commonly occurring in domestic violence.24  Accord-
ingly, victims may bring a civil action seeking an OP in family court25 while
simultaneously pursuing a criminal complaint based on the same abusive acts.26
1. Initiating a Family Court Petition
The decision to pursue an OP in family court lies solely with the victim,27
who must be a member of the abuser’s “family or household,”28 which is further
22. 1962 N.Y. Laws  ch. 688.
23. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(2)(b) (McKinney 2007).
24. Id. § 812(1); see also Family Protection and Domestic Violence Intervention Act of 1994, 1994 N.Y.
Laws  ch. 222 (“[W]hat was once largely considered a private matter has come to be more correctly re-
garded as criminal behavior.  The legislature [has determined] that domestic violence is criminal conduct
occurring between members of the same family or household which warrants stronger intervention than is
presently authorized under New York’s laws. . . . The victims of family offenses must be entitled to the
fullest protections of our civil and criminal laws.”).  Currently, offenses subject to Article Eight are disor-
derly conduct, harassment in the first and second degrees, aggravated harassment in the second degree,
stalking in the first, second, third, and fourth degrees, menacing in the second and third degrees, reckless
endangerment, assault in the second and third degrees, and attempted assault in the third degree.  N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1) (McKinney 2007). Offenses beyond the family court’s jurisdiction are attempted
murder, murder, and sex crimes. Criminal courts retain exclusive jurisdiction over all other enumerated
criminal offenses. Id; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 10 (McKinney 2007).  As of November 13,
2007, criminal mischief also qualifies as a family offense.  Assemb. 8854, 2007 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(N.Y. 2007).
25. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 828(1)(a), 841(d) (McKinney 2007).  Other states may refer to their versions of
orders of protection as “restraining orders” or “protection from abuse orders.”
26. Id. § 821-a(5)(a) (“At such time as the petitioner first appears before the court, the court shall advise the
petitioner that the petitioner may: continue with the hearing and disposition of such petition in the family
court; or have the allegations contained therein heard in an appropriate criminal court; or proceed concur-
rently in both family and criminal court.”); see also id. § 812(2)(g).
27. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(3) (“[No official] shall discourage or prevent any person who wishes to file a
petition or sign a complaint from having access to any court for that purpose.”); see also id. § 823(b).
Technically, only the court may dismiss a petition for lack of jurisdiction, and petitioners should be brought
before the judge prior to that determination.  In practice, however, clerks charged with assisting in filing
petitions exceed their authority and turn uninformed petitioners away once they determine that the peti-
tioner may not be able to establish a requisite relationship before the court.
28. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 812, 821(1)(a).
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defined as “(a) persons related by consanguinity or affinity; (b) persons legally
married to one another; (c) persons formerly married to one another; and (d)
persons who have a child in common regardless whether such persons have been
married or have lived together at any time.”29  The victim begins the process by
completing a petition, describing in detail the acts or threats of physical violence
suffered at the abuser’s hands, as well as alleging that each act constitutes a fam-
ily offense over which the family court has jurisdiction.30
2. The First Court Appearance and Emergency Relief
Once the petition is filed, the victim can be legally shielded from further
abuse in a matter of mere hours.  On the very same day as filing the petition, the
victim (the “petitioner”) appears ex parte before a family court intake judge.31
The vast majority of petitioners appear without counsel at this stage, although
petitioners and their abusers (the “respondents”) have a right to counsel at every
appearance.32  After briefly reviewing the allegations in the petition and inter-
viewing the petitioner, the intake judge determines if the allegations and sur-
rounding circumstances warrant any temporary relief.33  Upon a showing of good
cause, the intake judge may immediately issue a Temporary Order of Protection
(“TOP”), directing the respondent to refrain from engaging in certain behaviors
toward the petitioner.34  The conditions within the TOP should serve the TOP’s
purpose35—namely, to stem the tide of family violence36—and are guided by the
petitioner’s requests and the intake judge’s assessment of the seriousness of the
abuse.37  Typical TOP conditions include directing the respondent to: (1) stay
away from the petitioner, the petitioner’s house, school, and/or place of employ-
ment;38 (2) cease residing with the petitioner;39 (3) refrain from contacting the
29. Id. § 812(1)(a)–(d).  As shall be discussed, these classifications facially omit dating and same-sex couples.
30. See id. § 821(1)(a).  The victim must also apprise the court as to the existence of any children in the
household, explain their relationships to the parties, make a formal request for relief in the form of an OP,
and disclose whether any accusatory instrument alleging the same facts has been filed elsewhere. See id.
§ 821(c)–(e).
31. Id. §§ 153-c, 828(1).
32. Id. § 821-a(3)(a).  If a party is indigent, the court must appoint counsel. Id.
33. Id. § 828(1)(a).
34. Id. § 828(1).
35. Id. §§ 828(1)(a), 842(a).
36. Id. § 812(2)(b).
37. Id. § 828(1)(a).
38. Id. § 842(a).
39. Id. §§ 842(a), 842(d).  This is known as an “exclusion” OP.  The distinction between “stay away” and
“exclusion” is relevant when the parties reside in the same household and the respondent is being directed
to leave that residence.
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petitioner via mail, electronic/telephonic means, or third parties;40 (4) refrain
from acts or threats of violence toward the petitioner or any children or household
members who have been or are likely to be exposed to contact with the respon-
dent;41 and (5) surrender possession of any firearms.42  More rarely, the judge
may grant temporary custody and visitation of any children in common,43 order
temporary child support,44 or direct the respondent to participate in a batterer’s
education program that will address abusive behavior and refer the respondent to
any necessary alcohol or drug programs.45  The duration of TOPs vary by juris-
diction and individual judges, but they generally remain in effect until the par-
ties return to court, and they may be extended as necessary until a fact-finding
hearing is concluded.46  Whether or not a TOP is issued against the respondent,
the intake judge is empowered to issue a summons directing the respondent to
appear before the family court (in addition to notifying the respondent of the
allegations and the existence of any order).47
3. Subsequent Appearances and Possible Dispositions
Victims who have filed petitions with the family court may proceed to trial,
enter into settlements, or withdraw their petitions at any time subject only to the
court’s approval48 and the usefulness of such actions in ending the violence.  The
act of withdrawing the petition dismisses the case against the respondent and also
40. Id. § 842(j).  Although the “no contact” provisions are not explicitly permitted by Section 842, this catch-
all provision allows judges to impose any other condition necessary for the purpose of protection. See id.
41. Id. § 842(c).
42. Id. § 842-a(1)(a)–(b).
43. Id. § 842(b), 842(j).
44. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 828(4), 842(j).
45. See id. § 842(g).  Other permissible conditions include payment of counsel fees, payment of medical ex-
penses incurred arising from the incidents alleged in the petition, and directing the respondent to refrain
from intentionally injuring or killing any companion animal belonging to the petitioner or a minor child
in the house. See id. §§ 828, 842(f), 842(h)–(i).
46. Every OP issued under Article Eight must plainly state the date that it expires. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 154-c(1).
47. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 821-a(2)(a).  The respondent must be personally served with the summons and
petition.   Id. § 826.  While Section 154-a allows a copy of the petition to be served on the respondent at
the first court appearance if it cannot practically be served at the same time as serving the summons,
Section 826 requires that service of the summons be completed at least twenty-four hours prior to the time
of the court appearance.  The court may automatically direct the police or peace officers to serve the respon-
dent unless the petitioner volunteers to arrange service independently. See id. § 153-b(b)–(c).  The court
may also order an alternate form of service (e.g., service by mail or publication) if the petitioner can
demonstrate that personal service could not be completed after a “reasonable effort,” as in circumstances
where the respondent purposefully avoids personal service. However, an existing TOP is not enforceable
against the respondent unless it too is served upon him or her. See id. §§ 154-c(3), 153-b(a)–(c).  There-
fore any delay in serving the respondent with the summons and TOP delays both the court’s ability to
proceed with jurisdiction over the respondent and the petitioner’s ability to enforce the TOP.
48. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 821-a(5)(a)–(b); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3217 (McKinney 2007).
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terminates any TOP issued in conjunction with it.49  If the TOP obtained at an
initial court appearance is successful in ending the violence, some victims decline
to prosecute the case further.50 Conversely, victims may find that seeking protec-
tion incites abusers to increase the violence and control, whether emotionally,
physically, or financially.51  Multiple court appearances can also inadvertently
compromise the victim’s safety by giving abusers additional opportunities to har-
ass or stalk the victim,52 prompting victims to withdraw petitions until they feel
it is safer to proceed.53  Whatever concerns inform victims’ choices, the choices are
theirs alone.
If the petitioner chooses to proceed further in family court and establishes
that the respondent was properly served with the summons, a number of possible
dispositions are available.54  If the respondent fails to appear in court, the court
may leave the existing TOP in effect and remove the case from the court’s calen-
dar.  Alternatively, the court may enter a judgment on default after conducting
an inquest,55 wherein the petitioner testifies to the underlying facts of the case
and the court determines which family offenses, if any, are established by a pre-
ponderance of the credible evidence.56  The benefits of an inquest are that the
petitioner avoids cross-examination or contradiction from the respondent, due to
his or her absence, and any findings of domestic violence are admissible for pur-
poses of deciding later child custody and matrimonial claims.57
After a finding that the respondent committed a family offense, whether
after a full adversarial trial or an inquest, the court proceeds to a dispositional
hearing to determine which remedies are warranted by the abuse.58  Remedies
may include a new OP with any conditions that are necessary to protect the
49. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 821-a(b).  A petition is required to obtain a TOP; therefore, withdrawal
results in the vacating of the TOP, because the allegations upon which it was obtained no longer exist. See
id.  Some judges inquire into the petitioner’s reason for withdrawing the case, particularly if they have
reason to suspect that the petitioner is withdrawing the case out of fear or intimidation caused by the
respondent or by another person at the respondent’s urging.
50. See HART, supra note 21.
51. See id.
52. See id.
53. See  Elizabeth Munro, Litigating Family Offense Proceedings, in LAWYER’S MANUAL ON DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE:  REPRESENTING THE VICTIM 41 (Jill Laurie Goodman & Dorchen A. Leidholt eds., 4th ed.
2005).
54. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 841.
55. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3215(a)–(b) (McKinney 2007).
56. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 832 (McKinney 2007).  This course of action is slightly riskier for the petitioner
than merely removing the case from the court calendar, as it is possible that the judge will find no family
offense was committed and dismiss the petition. See id. § 841(a).
57. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 170, 240(1)(a) (McKinney 2007).
58. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 835(a), 833 (McKinney 2007).
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petitioner and are permitted under Section 842 of Article Eight of the FCA.59
The new OP may last between two and five years,60 depending on whether the
petitioner establishes that aggravating circumstances attended the abuse and jus-
tify an OP of longer duration.61  The court must, in issuing a new OP, also order
the respondent to surrender any firearms.62  The court is further empowered to
order other forms of relief to benefit the petitioner, including restitution for dam-
ages incurred and civil probation for the respondent.63
Even without an inquest or a hearing, a case may also resolve to the peti-
tioner’s benefit if the respondent appears, after being properly served, and con-
sents to the petitioner’s original TOP remaining in effect with the same or
modified conditions until an agreed-upon expiration date.64  When consenting, a
respondent makes no admission of wrongdoing, nor does the court make any find-
ings that could be used in later proceedings.65
4. Family Court Order of Protection Violations: A Choice
of Forum
When an abuser violates a family court OP, whether temporary or entered
after fact finding, the petitioner has the option of seeking redress through either
the family or the criminal courts, or both.66  The petitioner brings the violation to
the family court’s attention by filing a second petition alleging willful violation of
59. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 828, 842 (McKinney 2007); see also supra notes 37–45 and accompanying
text.
60. See id. § 842(i).  Practitioners refer to orders of protection entered after adjudication on the merits as
“permanent OPs.”
61. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842(i) (McKinney 2007).  Aggravating circumstances include the “use of a
dangerous instrument against the petitioner by the respondent, a history of repeated violations of prior
orders of protection by the respondent, prior convictions for crimes against the petitioner by the respondent
or the exposure of any family or household member to physical injury by the respondent and like incidents,
behaviors and occurrences which to the court constitute an immediate and ongoing danger to the peti-
tioner, or any member of the petitioner’s family or household.” Id. § 827(a)(vii).
62. Id. § 842-a(2)(a)–(b).
63. Id. §§ 841(c), 841(e).
64. See generally N.Y. R. UNIF. TRIAL CTS. § 205.12(a)–(b) (McKinney 2007) (directing the court to place
stipulations between the parties in written orders or in the court record).
65. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 828(2) (McKinney 2007).  Since TOPs are sometimes extended only as needed
from adjourn date to adjourn date, some judges allow respondents to also consent to OPs lasting up to five
years, without requiring that the judge make any finding of aggravated circumstances.  Of course, a
respondent who does not consent to a TOP can demand that the petitioner prove the allegations at trial.
See id. §§ 832, 841(a).  Both parties are then permitted to present evidence and challenge their adver-
sary’s evidence, after which the court determines if a preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that
the respondent committed a family offense. Id. If not, the court must dismiss the petition with prejudice
against the petitioner. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5013 (McKinney 2007).  However, if a family offense is estab-
lished, the court may proceed to a dispositional hearing in which the parties present any evidence that is
relevant and material to the court’s dispositional decision. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 834.
66. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 847.
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the OP.  As with the initial petition, the choice of moving forward on a violation
petition lies with the petitioner.  If a family court judge finds that the OP has
been violated, she may extend the OP, place the respondent on probation, or even
sentence the respondent to up to six months imprisonment,67 allowing the peti-
tioner to access typically criminal remedies through a civil proceeding.68  As shall
be seen, a victim who only utilizes the criminal justice system to address an OP
violation loses much of the control that the family court would afford him or her.
III. ARTICLE EIGHT’S LIMITATIONS ON DATING AND SAME-SEX COUPLES
A. Current Access to Family Court Orders of Protection
As previously stated, any victim seeking protection from the family court
must be a member of the abuser’s “family or household,”69 defined as “(a) persons
related by consanguinity or affinity; (b) persons legally married to one another; (c)
persons formerly married to one another; and (d) persons who have a child in
common regardless whether such persons have been married or have lived to-
gether at any time.”70
A plain reading of Article Eight’s definition of “family or household mem-
ber” obviously bars certain individuals from taking advantage of the family
court, regardless of the intimate, familial, or dependent nature of an abusive
relationship.71  Though the New York Court of Appeals has yet to consider the
question of how broadly to interpret Article Eight, appellate departments have
already refused to read a more inclusive view of families into the definition.  In
Anstey v. Palmatier,72 the Third Department held that Article Eight did not
permit the family court to assert jurisdiction over a woman seeking an OP
against her husband’s stepfather.73  According to the court, such a relationship did
not qualify as one of “affinity” within the meaning of Article Eight.74  Similarly,
in Orellana v. Escalante,75 the Fourth Department found that Article Eight
barred the court from asserting jurisdiction over the former stepfather of a peti-
tioner, because their relation by “affinity” ended when the respondent and peti-
67. Id. § 846-a.
68. Because violating an OP subjects the respondent to potential punitive remedies from both the family and
the criminal courts, the commencement of trial in one court automatically divests the other of jurisdiction
over the violation. See People v. Wood, 95 N.Y.2d 509 (2000).
69. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1).
70. Id. § 812(1)(a)–(d).
71. Only the family court itself, and not any person assisting the petitioner in filing, may decide issues of
jurisdiction. But see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
72. 803 N.Y.S.2d 767, 767 (3d Dep’t 2005).
73. Id. at 767.
74. Id.
75. 653 N.Y.S.2d 992 (4th Dep’t 1997).
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tioner’s mother divorced.76  In both of these instances, even though the stepfather
may have acted like an emotionally and financially supportive parent for years,
that parental behavior was not, absent a formal adoption by the stepparent,
enough to be recognized by a specialized court created to deal solely with family
matters.
Under these precedents, dating and same-sex couples holding themselves out
as spouses yet lacking children in common must construct legally cognizable rela-
tionships to obtain Article Eight benefits.  For heterosexual intimate partners, a
legally solemnized marriage will automatically place them within the jurisdiction
of not only Article Eight, but also other state and federal protections.77  Same-sex
couples have no similar statutory solution.  The Domestic Relations Law, while
not explicitly limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples or declaring same-sex
marriage unlawful,78 does speak of marriage in terms of husbands and wives.79
Despite the absence of a clear statutory prohibition, the Court of Appeals, in
Hernandez v. Robles,80 construed the DRL as limiting marriage to opposite-
sex couples81 and held that such limitation did not violate the New York State
Constitution.82  The decision effectively permits authorities issuing marriage li-
censes to deny licenses to same-sex couples, thereby preventing them from qualify-
ing as spouses under Article Eight.  Since Article Eight applies to unmarried
partners only when they share a child in common, only same-sex couples who
share a child through adoption may access the family court for protection.83
76. Id. 
77. The United States General Accounting Office has identified more than one thousand federal protections,
benefits, and responsibilities that apply only to married partners. See Letter from Barry R. Bedrick,
Associate General Counsel, United States General Accounting Office, to Hon. Henry J. Hyde, Chairman,
House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary (Jan. 31, 1997), available at http://www.gao.gov/
archive/1997/og97016.pdf.  The Defense of Marriage Act, which limits interpretation of the word “mar-
riage” to legal unions between one man and one woman for purposes of interpreting federal laws, ensures
that same-sex couples cannot access any of these benefits regardless of having entered into a union legally
recognized by a locality or a state. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).
78. Incestuous and bigamous marriages are automatically void under New York’s Domestic Relations Law,
while marriages in which one party is underage, mentally incapacitated, acting under force, fraud, or
duress, or incapable of having sexual relations are voidable by either party to the marriage. See generally
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 5–7 (McKinney 2007).
79. See , e.g., id. § 6.
80. 7 N.Y.3d 338 (2006).
81. Id. at 357.
82. Id. at 361.  The plaintiffs, forty-four same-sex couples who were denied marriage licenses by various
authorities, claimed that limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples violated the due process clause and the
equal protection clause of the New York State Constitution. Id. at 358.  After finding that the legislature
might have rationally limited marriage and its attendant benefits to opposite-sex couples in order to
promote family stability and permanence, the court denied each claim using a rational basis analysis. Id.
at 358–66.
83. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.  In the First Department’s opinion in Hernandez v. Robles,
from which the plaintiffs appealed, the court noted that “[m]arriage laws are not primarily about adult
needs for official recognition or support, but about the well being of children and society.” 805 N.Y.S.2d
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B. Practical Effects:  Victims and Control in the Criminal Justice
System
Without access to family court, victims falling beyond Article Eight’s juris-
diction must rely on the intervention of the criminal justice system.  Yet, in stark
contrast to their control over family court proceedings, victims interacting with
the criminal justice system are virtually powerless to influence the cases directly
affecting their lives.
1. First Contact: Discretionary Versus Mandatory Arrest
Most victims who call the police, either during or immediately following a
violent incident, assume that police intervention will end the violence and give
them the choice over filing charges.84  Yet the truth of that assumption depends on
the interaction of several different statutory provisions governing police conduct.
The extent to which certain domestic violence policies apply to an incident of
violence depends on the relationship between the victim and the abuser.  When
an offense is committed by a stranger, police retain total and absolute discretion
over the decision to arrest the offender.85  If the police do not make an arrest in
their discretion, the victim is also authorized to effectuate an arrest with police
assistance.86  Nevertheless, police may still decline to arrest the offender for lack of
reasonable cause.87
However, if the victim and abuser are members of the same “family or
household” (i.e., related by blood, marriage, or child in common),88 police respond-
ing to an incident are bound by a mandatory arrest policy.89  This policy requires
354, 360 (1st Dep’t 2005). Ironically, the court failed to observe that extending marital status to same-sex
couples might benefit children by giving their abused parents another venue through which to end family
violence.
84. See generally Bonnie L. Yegidis & Robin Berman Renzy, Battered Women’s Experiences with a
Preferred Arrest Policy, 9 AFFILIA 60 (1994) (detailing the disparities between one set of victims’ expec-
tations and the reality of police conduct under a “preferred” arrest policy, and revealing that most victims
polled had little familiarity with their locality’s arrest policies and found that their expectations of what
police would do once they arrived on the scene frustrated).
85. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(1)(a)–(b) (McKinney 2007) (explaining that “a police officer may
arrest a person” upon reasonable cause that a person has committed any offense in his presence or any
crime whether or not in his presence) (emphasis added).
86. See id. §§ 140.30, 140.40.
87. Id. § 140.40(4) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a police officer is not required to
take an arrested person into custody or to take any other action prescribed in this section on behalf of the
arresting person if he has reasonable cause to believe that the arrested person did not commit the alleged
offense or that the arrest was otherwise unauthorized.”).
88. Id. § 530.11(1) (“ ‘[M]embers of the same family or household’ [with respect to a proceeding in the crimi-
nal courts] shall mean the following:  (a) persons related by consanguinity or affinity; (b) persons legally
married to one another; (c) persons formerly married to one another; and (d) persons who have a child in
common, regardless whether such persons have been married or have lived together at any time.”).
89.  Id. § 140.10(4). New York promulgated its first mandatory arrest provision in the Family Protection
and Domestic Violence Intervention Act of 1994, 1994 N.Y. Laws ch. 222.  Furthermore, the Violence
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officers to arrest a suspect upon reasonable cause to believe that the suspect: (1)
committed a felony against the victim,90 (2) violated an OP directing the suspect
to stay away from the victim,91 (3) committed a family offense in the course of
violating an OP,92 or (4) committed a misdemeanor crime which constitutes a
family offense.93
The rationale for mandatory arrest policies is clear from the history of law
enforcement interaction with victims.  Prior to enactment of such policies, police
frequently responded to domestic violence incidents by instructing the abuser to
leave the household overnight, lecturing the victim on her role in instigating the
violence, or convincing the victim not to press charges because of the financial
hardships arrest would work on the family.94  Mandatory arrest eliminated most
of these practices by compelling police enforcement of domestic violence statutes.95
But while the policies offer immediate and decisive intervention, automatically
placing an abuser in police custody steals choice away from the victim.  Victims
calling the police may have needed immediate intervention to stop a violent at-
tack, but if they know the violence will escalate after an arrest, they may fear the
arrest more than the abuse itself.96  Additionally, the arrested individual will
likely miss at least one if not more days at work due to processing, arraignment,
time spent in custody, and subsequent court appearances.97  If he is the primary
Against Women Act (“VAWA”), first incarnated in 1994, requires that state and local governments receiv-
ing federal funding maintain some mandatory or pro-arrest policy for domestic violence cases. See 42
U.S.C. § 3796hh(c)(1)(A)–(B).
90. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(4)(a).
91. Id. § 140.10(4)(b)(i).
92. Id. § 140.10(4)(b)(ii).
93. Id. § 140.10(4)(c).  The officer shall neither inquire as to whether the victim seeks an arrest of such person
nor threaten the arrest of any person for the purpose of discouraging requests for police intervention. Id.
For all other types of offenses, including sex offenses, the police retain the same discretion to arrest as with
crimes committed by strangers. Id. § 140.10(1).
94. See  Bruce J. Winick, Applying the Law Therapeutically in Domestic Violence Cases, 69 UMKC L.
REV. 33, 37 (2000).
95. See Barbara Fedders, Lobbying for Mandatory-Arrest Policies: Race, Class, and the Politics of the
Battered Women’s Movement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 281, 289–91 (1997).
96. While preferring abuse to safety may appear counterintuitive to someone not experiencing abuse, a pattern
of abuse can become, if not predictable, at least expected by the victim such that she is able to internalize it
and perceive it as something over which she exerts control. See  HART, supra note 21.
97. For example, the Court of Appeals affirmed an interpretation of N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.20(1) as
requiring that police present defendants to a court for arraignment within twenty-four hours of arrest,
unless delay beyond that period can be satisfactorily explained. See generally Maxian v. Brown, 77
N.Y.2d 422 (1991).  The lower court found that the first eleven to fifteen hours following arrest in New
York County are “consumed” by police processes, and the Court of Appeals recognized that the “ ‘depriva-
tion entailed by prearraignment detention is very great with the potential to cause serious and lasting
personal and economic harm to the detainee.’ ” Id. at 426 (quoting the appellate court, 561 N.Y.S.2d 418,
422 (1st Dep’t 1990)).  Therefore, even when officers act quickly, a defendant arrested in the middle of the
night could miss at least one day of work.
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financial provider of the household, precious household resources will be spent on
attorney’s fees, bail, and fines, regardless of whether the victim intended for the
defendant to be arrested.98  Yet when the abuser is subject to mandatory arrest,
police must ignore these considerations.  Arrested abusers are instantly stigma-
tized as criminals, and considerations of how the arrest will affect the family’s
economic and social status become irrelevant.
The problem is even more ominous for victims who are not members of the
abuser’s “family or household.”  Unless the local law governing police conduct dif-
fers from the state’s mandates,99 police have no obligation to make an arrest if no
blood, marital, or child in common relationship exists between the abuser and the
victim, even if the suspect is accused of one of the otherwise proscribed acts.100
Technically, the police can refuse to arrest abusers even if victims request it.101
Though mandatory arrest policies place “family or household members” in the
seemingly untenable position of forgoing police intervention to keep control over
their lives, the clearly-defined policies give this group of victims at least some
certainty about what impact calling the police will have on their lives.  No such
certainty exists for dating and same-sex couples—it is virtually impossible for
them to make safe, informed choices regarding police intervention, and this dis-
crepancy poses yet another barrier to accessing the only form of help that is avail-
able to them.102
98. See  Winick, supra note 94, at 72.
99. For example, New York City defines domestic violence for arrest purposes as including violence between
“same-sex couples, intimate partners who have lived together at some point, and registered domestic part-
ners.” Special Issues: Lesbian, Gay, Bi & Transgender, Mayor’s Office to Combat Domestic Violence,
http://home2.nyc.gov/html/ocdv/html/issues/lesbian.shtml (last visited Oct. 10, 2007).
100. Nevertheless, statistics indicate that police overwhelmingly apply mandatory arrest provisions to intimate
partners who do not meet the “family or household” member definition.  In 2002, the New York Division
of Criminal Justice Services reported that “[s]uspects in non-family cases that met the offense component of
the unconditional and conditional mandatory arrest criteria were arrested at rates similar to those of
suspects in family cases that were actually covered by the legislation.” ADRIANA FERNANDEZ-LANIER ET
AL., COMPARISON OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REPORTING AND ARREST RATES IN NEW YORK STATE:
ANALYSIS OF THE 1997 AND 2000 DOMESTIC INCIDENT STATISTICAL DATABASES 4 (May 2002), availa-
ble at http://criminaljustice.state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/domviol_rinr/19972000dir_report.pdf.
101. See generally N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(4)(c).
102. For examples of procedures that responding police officers are not required to employ when responding to
domestic incidents involving dating or same-sex couples, see generally N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW
§ 140.10(5) (McKinney 2007). See also N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1).  One disparity is that investiga-
tions into violent incidents between “family or household” members must be recorded and filed on a spe-
cialized domestic incident report, while non-cognizable relationships are not entitled to this detailed record
of investigation unless provided for by local law.  Family and household members are also entitled to other
specific procedures at the time of arrest.  Prior to 1994, officers responding to scenes where both the
complainant and the suspect bore injuries would arrest both parties.  To avoid unduly arresting victims,
the legislature changed Section 140.10 to provide that police officers with reasonable cause to believe that
more than one family or household member has committed a misdemeanor family offense against another
must separately evaluate each complaint and attempt to arrest only the “primary physical aggressor,”
determined by comparing the extent of injuries inflicted by the parties, any threats of harm to the other
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Particularly for victims in same-sex relationships, requesting police inter-
vention raises a host of additional fears and questions, including the possibility of
being confronted with bias, ridicule, and disbelief from police officers.103  These
fears are not unfounded.  Upon discovering that a domestic violence call involves
same-sex partners, police often scoff at the notion that one woman could abuse
another, or that a man is incapable of defending himself against another man.104
In 2000, New York City police refused to take complaints from 9 percent of
LGBT victims reporting domestic violence.105  In 8 percent of all cases reported
to the police, the complainant was arrested, and 2 percent of all reports involved
some level of physical abuse by the police.106  Clearly, arrest is often a less than
preferable path to relief for victims of dating or same-sex domestic violence.
2. Prosecution and No-Drop Policies
Assuming the abuser is arrested, the criminal complaint is then forwarded to
a prosecutor, who at some point will likely inform the victim (the “complainant”
or “complaining witness”) that the prosecutor’s office adheres to a “no-drop pol-
icy.”107  “No-drop policies” are internal rules adopted by individual prosecutors’
offices that dictate that criminal cases shall not be dismissed solely because the
complainant requests such a disposition or is unwilling to participate in the pros-
ecution.  Rather, an uncooperative complainant, like any other hostile witness,
can sometimes be compelled to appear and testify against the defendant abuser.108
party or another household member, any known prior history of domestic violence, and any indications
that one of the parties acted defensively to protect herself. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.10(4)(c).
Some notice requirements are also applicable only to “family or household” members.  For example,
New York law requires responding officers to provide written notice to “family or household” member
complainants of their rights: (1) to information about obtaining orders of protection; (2) to assistance in
retrieving personal possessions, finding safe shelter, obtaining medical treatment, and receiving a copy of
the police report; (3) to seek legal counsel in family court; (4) to ask the district attorney or officer to file a
criminal complaint; and (5) to file a petition in family court and request an OP on the same day.  The
police must also provide the addresses and numbers of local domestic violence resources, and they must
apprise a “family or household” victim that both criminal and family courts possess the power to issue OPs
upon allegations constituting family offenses and that the family court has the power to order temporary
child support and custody of children. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.11(6).
103. Lundy, supra note 8, at 289–91.
104. Id.
105. KEN MOORE & RACHEL BAUM, ANTI-LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER DOMESTIC VIO-
LENCE IN 2000 25 (2001), available at http://www.qrd.org/qrd/www/orgs/avproject/2000ncavpdvrpt.
pdf.
106. Id.
107. See Angela Corsilles, Note, No-Drop Policies in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases: Guar-
antee to Action or Dangerous Solution?, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 853, 855–57 (1994).
108. Id. at 860 (describing tactics used by local prosecutors’ offices across the United States to secure conviction
while alleviating the dangers posed to the victim).   The New York Office for the Prevention of Domestic
Violence Model Domestic Violence Policy recommends that prosecutors and police presume victims will not
testify and instead become well-versed in evidence collection that would obviate the need to call victims as
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Again, the rationale for imposition of no-drop policies is clear from the his-
tory of domestic violence prosecutions.  Previously, victims who pressed charges
against their abusers and were later reluctant to participate in prosecuting the
case were permitted or encouraged to withdraw their complaints.109  As seen ear-
lier, victims withdraw charges out of fear, threats and coercion, inability to sup-
port the family without the abuser’s financial assistance, or a post-arrest increase
in intimate violence.110  Prosecutorial deference to victims’ requests resulted in
repeated cycles of arrest, arraignment, and withdrawal that reinforced abusers’
sense of power over victims and minimized the seriousness of the underlying
criminal behaviors.111  No-drop policies aim to end these cycles by (1) reinforcing
the prosecutor’s duty to treat domestic violence seriously, (2) emphasizing the
prosecutor’s role in representing the interests of the state rather than a single
victim,112 and (3) removing abusers’ power to coerce victims into withdrawing
charges.113
No-drop policies are not without drawbacks.  They deprive victims of any
control over criminal cases and also potentially endanger them, either by increas-
ing the likelihood of retaliation by abusers or by discouraging victims from seek-
ing police assistance during additional violence.114  Second, since the tools used to
enforce no-drop policies include subpoenaing victims and holding them in con-
tempt for refusing to cooperate, victims stand to be punished for reluctance to
participate in a proceeding that could further jeopardize their safety.115  Finally,
policies imposing prosecutorial control over victims can destroy burgeoning feel-
ings of self-empowerment that are necessary to help victims separate from their
witnesses. See OFFICE FOR THE PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, MODEL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
POLICY FOR COUNTIES (1998), available at http://www.opdv.state.ny.us/coordination/model_policy/crim
just.html; see also Donald J. Rebovich, Prosecution Response to Domestic Violence: Results of a
Survey of Large Jurisdictions, in LEGAL INTERVENTIONS IN FAMILY VIOLENCE: RESEARCH FINDINGS
AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 59 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice & American Bar Assoc. eds., 1998).
109. Corsilles, supra note 107, at 866–73 (explaining how prosecutors’ unwillingness to waste resources on
cases unlikely to proceed to conviction interacts with victims’ fears, distrust of the legal system, increased
emotional and physical abuse, and lack of financial stability to create attrition rates in domestic violence
cases).
110. Id. at 870–71.
111. See id. at 866.  The court quotes one prosecutor as stating that “it was a self-fulfilling prophesy. We’d file
if she really wanted us to, but we knew that she’d want us to drop charges later . . . we may have even
told her so. Then we sent her back home, often back to her abuser, without any support or protection at all.
Sure enough, she wouldn’t follow through and we’d think, ‘It’s always the same with these cases.’ ”. Id.;
see also Mary E. Asmus et al., Prosecuting Domestic Abuse Cases in Duluth: Developing Prosecu-
tion Strategies from Understanding the Dynamics of Abusive Relationships, 15 HAMLINE L. REV.
115, 117–18 (1991).
112.  See Corsilles, supra note 107, at 874.
113. Id .
114. Id. at 875–76.
115. Id.
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abusers, thus conveying them from one cycle of control into another, albeit less-
intimate, one.116
From a psychological standpoint, the paternalistic nature of mandatory-ar-
rest and no-drop policies impress upon victims that though they and their fami-
lies are at most risk of harm, the criminal justice system will concern itself with a
victim’s wishes only when those wishes comport with the prosecutor’s needs.117  A
single phone call for police assistance immerses victims into proceedings in which
defendants’ myriad rights are protected at all costs, while victim input is limited
by the prosecutor’s discretion.  The ultimate result is that these policies discourage
many victims from calling for police intervention the next time violence explodes
for fear of unwittingly becoming entangled in a criminal prosecution against
their partners, over which they will have no control.118  Access to the family court
is therefore essential to giving all victims ways to seek legal protection from
which they can later extricate themselves should the process prove harmful.
3. Emergency Relief
The prosecutor, and not the victim, determines whether or not to request a
TOP from the criminal court on behalf of the complainant.119  Such requests are
generally made at the defendant’s arraignment,120 are based upon the prosecutor’s
assessment of the severity of the violence, and are often made without the com-
plainant’s knowledge.121  Though a TOP is issued on behalf of the complainant,
the complainants themselves cannot dictate the duration or conditions of the TOP
116. Id.
117. See id. at 875–76.
118. See Fedders, supra note 95, at 292.
119. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 530.12, 530.13 (McKinney 2007).
120. These requests may be made at any point prior to trial. See id. §§ 530.12(1), 530.13(1) (stating that a
court may issue an OP when any criminal action is pending).  Courts may also issue OPs to ex parte
victims prior to apprehension and arraignment, provided that an accusatory instrument has been filed
against the defendant and that the facts presented establish good cause for the issuance of an OP. Id.
§§ 530.12(3), 530.13(2).
121. The statute merely requires a showing of “good cause” without specifically requiring that the victim ap-
pear to provide testimony or that the prosecutor offer any additional information beyond the facts alleged
in the accusatory instrument. See id. §§ 530.12(3), 530.13(2).  A prosecutor often may not have sufficient
time or contact information to consult with the victim prior to arraignment for the purpose of determining
the appropriateness of a TOP.  This lack of consultation with victims creates the potential for ill-fitting
TOPs and dangerous pretrial living situations.  A single violent incident may not be indicative of the
defendant’s overall lethality toward the victim, so the prosecutor cannot predict the likelihood of future
abuse from records of reported incidents. See, e.g., Malcolm Gordon, Validity of “Battered Women
Syndrome” in Criminal Cases Involving Battered Women, in LEGAL INTERVENTIONS IN FAMILY
VIOLENCE: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 65 (U.S. Dep’t of Justice & American Bar
Assoc. eds., 1998) (concluding that “there is no one pattern that characterizes all batterers’ behavior” and
illustrating that a victim’s personal assessment of the threat posed by an abuser is based on information
most prosecutors do not have access to without first speaking to the victim).
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in criminal court proceedings.122  As with decisions to prosecute, complainants
can only relay their opinions to prosecutors regarding the need for a TOP—they
cannot even be assured that they will have an opportunity to speak directly to the
issuing judge.  Any resultant TOP may or may not provide adequate protection
from a complainant’s perspective.123
Like a family court TOP, a criminal court TOP can direct that the defen-
dant, among other conditions, be ordered to stay away from the complainant and
his or her house, school, or place of employment.124  It may also direct the defen-
dant not to contact the complainant by mail, electronic/telephonic means, or via
third-party contact.125  The defendant may be directed to refrain from commit-
ting additional family offenses and from harming or threatening other members
of the complainant’s household.126  Finally, criminal TOPs can be extended as
necessary to protect the complainant while criminal charges are pending.127
However, assuming that the complainant requested and obtained a TOP at
the commencement of criminal proceedings, very little other relief is available
while the criminal charge is pending.  Defendants quite frequently waive their
statutory rights to speedy trials128 while plea negotiations and investigations are
ongoing, resulting in multiple adjournments with little if any progress toward
dispositions.  Complainants do not need to attend these court appearances unless
called as witnesses, yet many find themselves returning to court for several
months in order to stay abreast of the status of cases and remind prosecutors of
their interests in the outcomes.129  And unless a defendant remains held on bail
while the case is pending, a TOP is the only preventative measure a complainant
has until a sentence is rendered.130
122. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 530.12(3), 530.13(2).
123. See Corsilles, supra note 107, at 875–76.
124. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 530.12(1)(a), 530.13(1)(a).  In determining which conditions to include
within a TOP issued against a victim’s family or household member, the court considers the history of
abuse, threats, drug and alcohol abuse, access to weapons, and whether the TOP is likely to achieve its
protective purpose without such conditions. Id. § 530.12(1)(a).
125. Although not specifically provided for by the New York Criminal Procedure Law in Section 530.12 and
Section 530.13, the standardized forms established for use by the criminal courts explicitly contain such
prohibitions. See  New York State Unified Court System Homepage, http://www.courts.state.ny.us/
forms/familycourt/pdfs/crim1.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2007).
126. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 530.12(1)(c)–(d), 530.13(1)(b).
127. Id. §§ 530.12(4), 530.13(3).
128. Id. § 30.30(1)–(3).
129. See Corsilles, supra note 107, at 870; see also HART, supra note 21.
130. Of several statutory provisions relating to setting pretrial release conditions, only two address victims’
safety. See generally N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.
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4. Criminal Dispositions and Orders of Protection
The relief that ultimately becomes available hinges on the disposition of the
criminal case.  A defendant is only subject to probation or substantial imprison-
ment after a verdict or plea of guilty to offenses designated as “crimes,” that is,
any offense of misdemeanor level or higher.131  Offenses valued as less than mis-
demeanors are labeled “violations,” and the maximum penalty for a conviction for
a violation ranges from monetary fines to fifteen days imprisonment.132   Resti-
tution may also be ordered in conjunction with any sentence.133  More typically,
the court allows the defendant to plead guilty and will impose limiting conditions
on release rather than subjecting the defendant to probation (known as “condi-
tional discharge”).134  In the alternative, the court may grant an Adjournment in
Contemplation of Dismissal (“ACD”).135  As a requirement of probation, condi-
tional discharge or ACD, the court may order the defendant to attend a batterer’s
intervention or education program.136  None of the aforementioned dispositions
are within a complainant’s direct power to control or influence.  Defendants
alone may demand trial,137 and prosecutors possess the power to compel reluctant
victims to testify,138 two facts of which criminal complainants become aware
through lengthy and repeated adjournments and their interactions with prosecu-
tors.  Even plea bargains are often determined among prosecutors, defense coun-
131. See generally N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.00(1)(a), art. 70 (McKinney 2007).
132. Id. § 55.10(3)(a).  A typical violation charge in domestic violence contexts is harassment in the second
degree. See id. § 240.26.
133. See generally id. § 60.27.
134. See id. § 65.05.
135. See generally N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.55(1) (McKinney 2007).  A disposition of ACD releases the
defendant on his own recognizance and removes the case from the court calendar for a specified time
period after which it is automatically dismissed unless the prosecutor moves to have it restored to the
calendar and proceeds with prosecution. See id. § 170.55(2).  To receive an ACD, the defendant does not
have to make any admission of guilt. Id. § 170.55(8).
136. See id. § 170.55(4); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10 (McKinney 2007).
137. See generally N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 30.30 (McKinney 2007) (describing when a defendant may
move to dismiss pending charges due to a prosecutor’s failure to be ready for trial within certain specified
time periods, excluding periods of continuance granted at the defense’s request).  The only provision per-
taining to complaining witnesses is that which allows the prosecution additional time to try a case when
the people were ready for trial before time expired and subsequently become unready for trial due to “some
exceptional fact or circumstance” like the “sudden unavailability of evidence material to the people’s case,
when the district attorney has exercised due diligence to obtain such evidence and there are reasonable
grounds to believe that such evidence will become available in a reasonable period.” Id. § 30.30(3)(b).
138. See  N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 610.20 (McKinney 2007) (allowing the court, the prosecutor, or the defen-
dant to issue a subpoena for the attendance of a witness at the proceeding); see id. §§ 620.10, 620.20
(allowing the witness to be adjudged a material witness in a pending criminal action and fixing bail to
secure his or her future attendance at the proceedings). A witness who is unable to comply with the bail
requirements is remanded to the custody of the sheriff. Id. § 620.50.
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sel, and judges without consulting the complainants whose safety is most directly
affected.139
When a complainant’s safety does remain a concern, a new OP may be is-
sued in conjunction with a conviction.140  The duration of most criminal OPs is
determined by the seriousness of the charge underlying the conviction.  A guilty
plea to a violation authorizes a new two-year OP.141  For misdemeanor convic-
tions, OPs can last up to five years,142 and felony convictions authorize the impo-
sition of OPs lasting up to eight years.143  An exception to these offense-duration
correlations arises when a case is disposed of by ACD.  In those instances, the
court is limited to issuing a new TOP, and the length of both the TOP and the
ACD depends on the existence of a blood, marital, or child in common relation-
ship between the defendant and the complainant.144  If such a relationship exists,
the ACD may remain in effect for one year, and the court may issue a TOP also
139. See id. §§ 340.20(4), 220.50(5) (setting forth procedures for memorializing a sentence agreed upon by the
prosecutor  and the defendant prior to the defendant pleading guilty).  New York Criminal Procedure
Law Section 220.50(4) contemplates situations where the permission of the court or the prosecutor is a
necessary prerequisite to the defendant pleading guilty.  Victims are permitted to make statements at
sentencing or to presentence investigators. See id. §§ 380.50, 390.30.  However, the defendant is afforded
an opportunity to rebut any in-court statement made by the victim, and the victim must request permis-
sion to make the statement at least ten days prior to the sentencing date in felony cases. Id. §§
380.50(2)(b), 380.50(2)(d), 380.50(2)(e).
140. As with family court OPs issued after a fact-finding hearing, an OP issued after a verdict or plea of guilty
is also usually dubbed a “permanent” OP.  The provisions of the New York Criminal Procedure Law
authorizing permanent OPs fall under the sections relating to bail, not sentencing. See generally N.Y.
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530 (McKinney 2007).
141. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 530.12(5), 530.13(4). The most recently updated version of Section 530.12(5)
states as follows:  “Upon conviction of any crime or violation between spouses, parent and child, or be-
tween members of the same family or household, the court may in addition to any other disposition,
including a conditional discharge . . . enter an order of protection. . . . The duration of such an order shall
be fixed by the court and, in the case of a felony conviction, shall not exceed the greater of (i) eight years;
. . . or in the case of a class A misdemeanor, shall not exceed five years from the date of such conviction; or
in the case of a conviction for any other offense, shall not exceed two years from the date of conviction.”
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.12(5) (emphasis added); see id.§ 530.13(4) (mirroring these terms for those
parties not related by blood or marriage); id. § 1.20(13) (noting that “conviction” means the entry of a plea
of guilty to, or a verdict of guilty upon, an accusatory instrument).
142. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.12(5). The new law comes into effect on September 1, 2009.  It will
provide for five-year OPs for felonies and three-year OPs for misdemeanors. Notably, the vast majority of
domestic violence offenses fall within the violation and misdemeanor categories.  Thus, very few victims
ever benefit from a criminal OP lasting longer than five years.
143. Id.
144. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.55(2)–(3).  The statute references subdivision one of Section 530.11 of
the chapter, which requires the parties to be related by blood, marriage, former marriage or a child in
common. Id.  This means that if a petitioner has a family relationship, the ACD can last longer.  The
section further states that in conjunction with the ACD, the court may issue a TOP under Section 530.12
or Section 530.13, which, as previously noted, allow TOPs for family offenses and non-family offenses,
respectively. Id.  So, if the ACD is the non-familial shorter version, then the accompanying TOP is
shorter as well.
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lasting up to one year.145  Absent such a relationship, both the ACD and the OP
are limited to six months duration.146  The practical import of the distinction is
that victims in dating and same-sex relationships, even when fully cooperative
with the criminal process, may remain legally protected for only half as long as
similarly situated victims in recognized “family or household” relationships with-
out the benefit of access to the family court’s concurrent jurisdiction.
5. Disparities in Burdens and Available Relief
Finally, in addition to a lack of control over criminal cases, it must be noted
that victims who are not related to their abusers by blood, marriage, or children
in common face higher burdens of proof in obtaining permanent OPs.  For exam-
ple, a victim alleging third degree assault in family court must prove her case by
a preponderance of the credible evidence or else face dismissal of her claim.147
Provided she is able to prove actual physical injury or some other aggravating
factor, the court may grant her a five-year OP.148  In contrast, absent any plea-
bargaining, a criminal trial for the same assault requires a prosecutor to prove
the case beyond a reasonable doubt before the court may issue a permanent OP.149
IV. OVERCOMING ARTICLE EIGHT’S EXCLUSIVITY
A. Expanding “Family”: A Definitional Approach
In Hernandez v. Robles, the Court of Appeals raised the specter that New
York’s legislature drafted the DRL with the intent of prohibiting same-sex mar-
riage.150  If true, the exclusion of dating and same-sex couples from Article
Eight’s definition of “family or household” may be interpreted as a consistent
attempt by the legislature to avoid inadvertently recognizing same-sex
relationships.151
145. See  N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 170.55(2), 530.11, 530.12.  The OP forms used differ depending on
whether the OP (or TOP) is based on a family offense or a non-family offense. See  New York State
Unified Court System, Criminal Form 1, http://www.courts.state.ny.us/forms/familycourt/pdfs/crim1.pdf
(last visited Sept. 12, 2007); see also  New York State Unified Court System, Criminal Form 2, http://
www.courts.state.ny.us/forms/familycourt/pdfs/crim2.pdf (last visited Sept. 12, 2007).
146. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 170.55(2)–(3). 
147. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 832, 841(a).
148. See id. §§ 827(a)(vii), 842(i).
149. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 300.10(2).
150. 7 N.Y.3d 338, 357 (2006).
151. In response to the Article Eight limitations, domestic violence advocacy groups have confronted the New
York legislature with the possibility of expanding the Family Court Act definition of “family and house-
hold members” to include intimate partners.  As recently as March 2006, the New York State Senate
considered amending both the Family Court Act and the Criminal Procedure Law to include jurisdiction
over “unrelated persons who are or have been in an intimate or dating relationship regardless whether
such persons have lived together at any time” and expanding “family or household” members to include
“unrelated persons who are continually or at regular intervals living in the same household or who have
in the past continually or at regular intervals lived in the same household.” See S. 7068, 228th Leg.
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Yet unwillingness to extend marital status to same-sex couples need not ex-
clude dating and same-sex couples from access to domestic violence remedies.  This
principle operates in numerous states where public opposition to same-sex mar-
riage resulted in state constitutional amendments banning such unions.152  Soon
after, these same states also amended their domestic violence statutes to ensure
that, despite being denied marital benefits, abused partners will not be precluded
from legal protection and relegated to remaining in abusive situations on the
basis of their sexualities.153  For example, Ohio amended its constitution to state
that “only a union between one man and one woman may be a marriage valid in
or recognized by this state and its political subdivisions, [which] shall not create
or recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends
to approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage.”154  In
response to fears that the amendment’s language would prevent domestic violence
statutes from applying to abused same-sex partners, Ohio revised the statutes to
define, “family or household members” as including persons “living as a spouse,”
i.e., those who live or have lived with the offender within five years of an alleged
act of violence.155  An Ohio appellate court subsequently held that the language of
the statutory definition violated the anti-same-sex-marriage amendment.156
However, the court also acknowledged that the legislature’s intent in drafting the
statute was to protect individuals from violence rather than to surreptitiously
garner official recognition for same-sex relationships.  To serve that intent, the
court suggested using broader statutory language making all domestic violence
remedies available to any person who currently or previously shared living
quarters with an alleged abuser.157  In September 2007, the Supreme Court of
(N.Y. 2005). Yet after each legislative session, the suggested changes have failed to materialize, and the
statute has never been passed.
152. Under the federal Defense of Marriage Act, states are permitted to disregard the act of any other state
recognizing marriage between same-sex couples. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).  As of late 2006, twenty-
seven states had followed Congress’s example by passing state constitutional amendments limiting, or
permitting the state legislature to limit, marriage to a union between one man and one woman. See
ALLIANCE DEFENSE FUND, DOMAWATCH, MARRIAGE AMENDMENT SUMMARY, http://www.doma
watch.org/amendments/amendmentsummary.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2006) (listing those states that
passed or attempted to pass marriage amendments to their respective state constitutions).
153. For example, Missouri and Kansas have left domestic violence protections available for same-sex partners
by making their laws applicable to adults who currently do or formerly have shared a residence. LGBT
TASK FORCE, ACLU OF KANSAS & WESTERN MISSOURI, THE RIGHTS OF LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL
AND TRANSGENDERED PEOPLE IN MISSOURI AND KANSAS (2006), available at http://www.aclukswmo.
org/chapters/lgbt.htm#violence.
154. OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11.
155. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2919.25(F)(1)(a)(i), 2930.01(D), 3113.31(A)(3)(1), 3113.31(A)(3)(4)
(2005).
156. State v. Ward, 849 N.E.2d 1076, 1077, 1082 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006), rev’d sub nom. In re Ohio Domes-
tic-Violence Statute Cases, 872 N.E.2d 1212 (Ohio 2007).
157. See id. at 1082.
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Ohio reversed this appellate decision, holding that the domestic violence statute
“does not create or recognize a legal relationship that approximates the designs,
qualities, or significance of marriage,” and that the statute simply creates “a clas-
sification with significance to . . . domestic-violence statutes.”158
While New York’s lack of a constitutional ban on same-sex unions distin-
guishes it from Ohio, Ohio’s approach exemplifies how a carefully crafted statu-
tory scheme can address intimate violence without effectively elevating dating
and same-sex couples to married status.  In its current form, Article Eight’s lim-
ited provisions avoid ascribing any legal status to same-sex relationships to the
detriment of its stated purpose of eliminating violence.159  To avoid this inconsis-
tency, without formally recognizing any additional status for dating and same-
sex relationships, the legislature must redefine Article Eight entirely.  First, the
concept of domestic violence under Article Eight must be expanded without refer-
ence to blood, marital, or child in common relationships, a change supported by
the similar rates of violence among same-sex couples, dating couples, and couples
already meeting the “family or household” definition.160  Next, “members of the
same family or household” must be divided into two separate categories of eligible
family court petitioners.  The first category, “members of the same family,” would
retain Article Eight’s original limitation to parties related by blood, marriage, or
a child in common.  A separate category of “members of the same household”
would then permit anyone sharing living quarters, including dating and same-
sex couples161 to immediately petition the family court for an OP without first
having a child in common.  In this manner, Article Eight protections could be
extended to all types of family relationships without forming a legal basis for
recognition of same-sex marriage.
B. A Functional Approach
While redefining the relationships to which Article Eight applies is the most
direct, precise means of opening the family court to dating and same-sex couples,
a broader definitional system allowing courts to determine jurisdiction by certain
delineated factors would increase the likelihood that nontraditional families will
not be precluded from obtaining OPs.
158. State v. Carswell, 871 N.E.2d 547, 554 (Ohio 2007).
159. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 812(1)(a)–(d), 812(2)(b).  Article Eight’s current structure is even more non-
sensical when considered in light of the New York Social Services Law, which extends domestic violence
preventative services to “family or household members” consisting of “unrelated persons who are continu-
ally or at regular intervals living in the same household or who have in the past continually or at regular
intervals lived in the same household.” N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 459-a(2)(e) (McKinney 2007).
160. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
161. This new category would also cover step-relationships held excluded from Article Eight protection in
Anstey v. Palmatier and Orellana v. Escalante. See supra notes 72–76 and accompanying text.
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In some contexts, New York has already granted the term “family” broad
interpretation when it appears in statutes intended to protect family expectations.
In Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co.,162 the Court of Appeals mandated broad
interpretation of New York City’s rent control regulations to recognize same-sex
partners as “families” and to qualify them for protection from eviction when the
lease-holding partner dies.163  In interpreting the statute, the court sought to
“avoid objectionable consequences,”164 “prevent hardship and injustice,”165 and
effectuate the purpose of a remedial statute “designed to promote the public
good.”166 Concluding that its use of the term “family” signified the legislature’s
intent to protect expectations of adults in emotionally and financially interdepen-
dent relationships,167 the court noted that its interpretation “comport[ed] both
with our society’s traditional concept of ‘family’ and with the expectations of indi-
viduals who live in such nuclear units.”168  Trial courts were advised to examine
subsequent claims by “the exclusivity and longevity of the relationship, the level
of emotional and financial commitment, the manner in which the parties have
conducted their everyday lives and held themselves out to society, and the reliance
placed upon one another for daily family services.”169
Despite the specifically enumerated “family or household” members under
Article Eight, courts deciding future challenges to the statute should broadly in-
terpret its applicability according to Braschi ’s principles of serving public expec-
tations and remedial purposes.  Just as individuals living in non-traditional
familial units stand to suffer virtually identical injuries and collateral conse-
quences from abuse as those families permitted to use the family court, they should
also expect to have identical rights and protections from abuse as any legally
recognized victim.  The fact that the Braschi court was concerned with a surviv-
ing partner’s expectations of and the public’s interest in housing availability
should not limit the application of similar reasoning to interpretation of Article
Eight—the interests at stake for domestic violence victims are equally as compel-
ling as avoiding eviction, if not more so.  As mentioned earlier, victims attempt-
ing to end abuse in any intimate relationship risk losing not just housing, but also
162. 74 N.Y.2d 201 (1989).
163. Id. at 211. The regulation at issue in Braschi, 9 N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. § 2204.6(d), provided
that upon the death of a rent-controlled tenant, the landlord may not evict “either the surviving spouse of
the deceased tenant or some other member of the deceased tenant’s family who has been living with the
tenant.” 74 N.Y.2d at 206 (emphasis added). However, the term “family” was nowhere defined within the
regulation when the court decided Braschi.  See id.
164. Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 208.
165. Id. 
166. Id.
167. See id. at 211.
168. Id .
169. Id. at 212–13.  The legislature later adopted and codified these factors. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. &
REGS. tit. 9, § 2204.6(d)(3)(i)(a)–(h) (2007).
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support, employment, or life itself.170  Physical safety and economic security may
depend on a victim’s ability to control the initiation, scope, and course of any legal
claims—control they may fully expect to command up until the moment it is
denied them, with potentially disastrous results.
Additionally, Article Eight resembles the Braschi rent control statute in that
it is remedial in nature.  The articulated purpose of Article Eight, to end violence
and return the family to safety,171 by extension serves the public good:  increased
family safety potentially increases work productivity and child stability,172 and
decreases the amount of resources expended on future criminal justice interven-
tion and public assistance benefits.173  Expanding the applicability of Article
Eight protections to relationships beyond the current “family or household” mem-
ber definition will only further serve the Article’s stated and implied purposes by
widening the base of individuals eligible to address violence in a more private,
civil manner—rather than through arrest and prosecution.  Therefore, Article
Eight should be amended to permit the family court to apply the Braschi factors
and accept jurisdiction over any case in which it finds that the petitioner is in a
committed, financially and emotionally interdependent relationship with the
respondent.
C. Registries
As either a supplement or an alternative to modifying Article Eight, the
legislature should create a new statewide domestic partnership or household reg-
istry allowing authorities to expeditiously determine if parties seeking relief have
established a family-like unit that would presumptively grant them access to a
family court OP.
To a limited extent, the legislature has already recognized that the modern
concept of “family” extends beyond blood, marital, or child in common relation-
ships.  New York City’s Administrative Law, under the purview of the state
legislature, permits registration of domestic partnerships between any two people
who, among other things, are not married or related by blood in a manner that
would bar marriage between them in New York State,174 who have a close, com-
mitted personal relationship, and who live together on a continuous basis at the
170. See generally Lundy, supra note 8, at 275–76.
171. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(2)(b) (McKinney 2007).
172. See generally ELEANOR LYON, WELFARE AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: LESSONS FROM
RESEARCH (2002), available at  http://www.vawnet.org/DomesticViolence/Research/VAWnetDocs/AR_
Welfare2.pdf; LUNDY BANCROFT & JAY G. SILVERMAN, ASSESSING RISK TO CHILDREN FROM BATTER-
ERS (2002), available at http://www.vawnet.org/DomesticViolence/ServicesAndProgramDev/Service
ProvAndProg/RisktoChildren.pdf.
173. See generally NAT’L CTR. FOR INJURY PREVENTION AND CONTROL, supra note 15.
174. New York City Marriage Bureau Online, Domestic Partnership, http://nycmarriagebureau.com/Mar-
riageBureau/index.htm?DomesticPartnership.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2007).
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same address.175  The declared purpose of a New York City domestic partnership
is to recognize “the diversity of family configurations, including lesbian, gay and
other non-traditional couples.”176  Receipt of a Certificate of Domestic Partner-
ship qualifies one for rights and benefits that include bereavement and child care
leave for city employees, visitation in city-operated health facilities, designation
as a family member on city-owned housing leases and succession to occupancy
rights in some buildings supervised by the Department of Housing Preservation
and Development, and receipt of city employee health benefits provided to family
members pursuant to stipulations or collective bargaining agreements.177
All of the above-listed benefits are aimed at maintaining non-traditional
couples’ stability in ways commonly afforded to traditional families rooted in het-
erosexual marriages, evincing a legislative intent to serve the expectations of
partners living in non-traditional families. Therefore, New York already has a
legal mechanism through which to extend family court OPs to dating and same-
sex couples: a legal presumption of a family relationship established by presenting
the court with a Certificate of Domestic Partnership.  Thus, these legislative ini-
tiatives are independent from any state-wide initiatives to legally recognize
same-sex marriage.
However, creating a presumption of this nature through the implementa-
tion of a state-wide domestic partnership law would inevitably require
thousands of localities to grant partners economic benefits historically denied to
any non-heterosexual, non-married relationship, at tremendous administrative
costs to businesses and local government.  In response to these difficulties, the
legislature should create a domestic household registry, enrollment in which is
available to both couples bearing a Certificate of Domestic Partnership and any
other partners or family units holding themselves out as families.  The registry
would list the members of any registered households, maintain a state-wide cen-
tral database of all households, and issue formal paperwork to members reflecting
household composition.  As with a Certificate of Domestic Partnership, a family
court resolving jurisdictional issues could refer to the registry or to a copy of the
paperwork in determining if the presumption of a shared family or household
applies to petitioners.  Properly registered households can thus preserve the right
to utilize the family court well before legal interventions become necessary.
One paramount advantage of household registries over state-wide domestic
partnership laws is that a registry concept permits the legislature to incre-
mentally assign rights and benefits to registered households as it deems necessary.
Whereas a Certificate of Domestic Partnership already constitutes evidence of
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vest any economic entitlements in the enrolled households, giving the legislature
an opportunity to consider the desirability of extending additional benefits to
those groups.
In creating a household registry, the legislature must also answer several
other questions.  What degree of intent must be shown to register, and how should
that intent be quantified?  Further, once a family unit is registered as a recog-
nized household, under what circumstances can individuals be removed from the
registry?  In considering these questions, the legislature should also consider pro-
cedures for verifying household membership and requiring parties to examine the
seriousness of their decisions to register.178  Finally, given that abuse often con-
tinues after parties stop recognizing a formal relationship between them, the leg-
islature must contemplate a policy favoring continued access to family court OPs
even after a party removes the abusive household from the registry.
V. CONCLUSION
The disparity in victims’ control in the New York family and criminal
courts, and the lack of any substantial difference in the experiences of domestic
violence victims from every type of intimate relationship highlight the funda-
mental inconsistency of excluding dating and same-sex couples from obtaining
family court orders of protection under Article Eight.   Minor changes to the
statutory language and interpretation of the Family Court Act can remedy these
irrational limitations without extending marriage to same-sex couples, allowing
courts to examine evidence of familial commitment and obligations within house-
holds in determining jurisdiction over an offense.  Without these legislative con-
cessions, Article Eight ignores a vast population of victims and fails to meet its
goal of ending family violence.
178. One possibility to serve this end is the implementation of a no-withdrawal policy.
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